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CSIS Southeast Asia Guidelines for the New Administration
February 10, 2017， Written By
Amy Searight
Senior Adviser and Director, Southeast Asia Program
Murray Hiebert
Senior Adviser and Deputy Director, Southeast Asia Program
Geoffrey Hartman
Fellow, Asia Program, Southeast Asia Program
Southeast Asia is an increasingly important region, encompassing some of
the most dynamic economies in the world and located at the crossroads between
East and South Asia, and the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The 10 Southeast Asian
countries that make up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—which
serves as the convening power in the region—have emerged as the lynchpin of
economic integration efforts in Asia, as well as the arena in which
geopolitical rivalries between China, the United States, Japan, and India play
out.
Effective engagement with Southeast Asia remains important for the
advancement of U.S. economic and strategic interests, but cooperation with the
region is becoming more complicated. The rejection of elites and the rise of
populist governments in recent elections have led to increasingly insular and
in some cases nondemocratic governance in Southeast Asia. The past two U.S.
administrations have made real strides in strengthening ties with this vital
region, and maintaining focus on Southeast Asia, despite growing difficulties,
is key to broader U.S. strategy in Asia going forward.
Southeast Asia is being confronted by growing external challenges—the rise
of China in particular—at the same time that the effectiveness of local governments
is being weakened by the same antiestablishment trends that are fraying the
post-Cold War order in many parts of the world. The populist uprising against elites is already well under way in
Southeast Asia, which also has to contend with the security challenges posed by
the rise of China to great power status and the spillover effects chaos in the
Middle East is having on the broader Islamic world.
- Populist and
inward-looking leaders control the presidencies in both Indonesia and the
Philippines after the unexpected rise of local mayors Joko “Jokowi” Widodo
and Rodrigo Duterte. Seemingly unassailable elite institutions like the
ruling coalition in Malaysia are having to make unprecedented efforts to
hold on to power. Meanwhile, Thailand is once again under military rule
after toppling a second democratically elected government led by the
populist Shinawatra family.
- While local
elites are busy fending off or succumbing to populist challenges to their
rule, the rise of China is rapidly changing the strategic realities in the
region. Southeast Asian countries want to continue to enjoy strategic
autonomy while relying on China’s economic engine for growth, but growing
Chinese ambitions are making that balance more difficult to maintain.
China is steadily building the economic and military wherewithal to pose
the first real challenge to U.S. dominance in the Western Pacific since
the end of World War II. China under Xi Jinping has not been shy about
throwing its growing weight around, particularly in the South China Sea,
and is unlikely to become more accommodating as the regional balance of
power shifts in its favor.
- Meanwhile,
the spread of Islamic extremism and threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia
continues to be a major worry, exacerbated by the ongoing chaos in the
Middle East. Propaganda from the Islamic State and other terrorist groups
is spurring radicalization among local Muslim populations, and there is
concern that fighters returning from the war in Syria will bring back
skills that will boost the capability of Southeast Asia terrorist groups.
Due to several recent political transitions, governments in Southeast Asia
are focused on domestic politics and narrow self-interest, making them less
willing and able to work with other Southeast Asian states and outside partners
to address the growing external challenges that are facing the region. The rise of populism in the region has led to a greater
inward focus and prickly nationalism in Indonesia and the Philippines, and
rising authoritarianism in Malaysia and Thailand.
- Indonesia’s
step back under Jokowi from its traditional leadership role in Southeast
Asia has been particularly consequential and has left ASEAN without the
guidance of Southeast Asia’s largest country at an inopportune time. At
the same time, Washington’s fraying ties with its allies in Bangkok and
Manila are undermining the U.S. security bulwark in Southeast Asia when it
is in need of being bolstered, and emerging U.S. partners like Malaysia
are too focused on domestic political scandals to help fill the gap.
- China is
exploiting the vacuum of leadership in the region to its own advantage,
dividing ASEAN to prevent challenges to its expansive claims and military
construction efforts in the South China Sea. China’s efforts to dominate
the South China Sea are steadily raising tensions with the United States,
increasing the risks of a military confrontation that would force
Southeast Asian states to choose sides between the competing powers.
- While
regional governments remain stalwart on countering terrorist threats,
there has been a growing willingness to accommodate rising religious
intolerance for political gain. This not only complicates deradicalization
efforts by mainstreaming the views of extremist groups, but also
negatively impacts social stability by politicizing race and religion.
Guidelines for Engaging Southeast Asia
To successfully navigate a more complicated operating environment in
Southeast Asia, the new administration should approach the region with the
following guidelines in mind:
- Make the Case
for Engagement
Southeast Asia remains especially important to U.S. interests, in spite of
a more difficult working environment. The ASEAN countries are in a prime
geostrategic location, are home to a young and growing population of 630 million,
and make up the third-largest economy in Asia after China and Japan. Southeast
Asia offers strong economic opportunities for U.S. companies, with ASEAN being
the United States’ fourth-largest global trading partner and supporting about
half a million jobs in the United States. The stock of U.S. direct investment
in ASEAN totaled $250 billion at the end of 2015, more than all U.S. investment
in China, India, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and New Zealand combined.
The case for continued high-level and intensive engagement with Southeast
Asia is compelling, and the administration should make that case to the
American people. An early speech by a senior administration official laying out
the importance of Asia—including Southeast Asia—to U.S. interests and
reiterating U.S. commitment to remain engaged and active in the region would go
a long way toward building goodwill with allies and partners in the region.
- Prioritize
Economic Cooperation
Southeast Asian countries view security through the lens of economic
growth and integration, and they place a high priority on their economic
relationship with the United States. This focus remains even under more
populist and nationalistic leadership. The United States cannot effectively
work with the region without an equally strong focus on economic engagement,
and it is imperative that the administration continue to exercise economic
leadership in the region.
Modifying as needed and completing the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is
the best way to advance U.S. economic interests in Southeast Asia, but
Washington should devise and promote other ideas and vehicles for economic
engagement in the region whether or not the TPP is ultimately ratified. In
particular, Washington should work with major non-TPP ASEAN economies
Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines to strengthen trade and investment
ties and improve economic governance. In Indonesia, which makes up almost half
of Southeast Asia’s economy, Washington should explore strengthening dialogue
on trade and investment to reduce red tape, simplify regulations, and ease
restrictions against investors.
The United States should also do more to support ASEAN’s internal efforts
at economic integration through the Single Window and other trade facilitation
initiatives. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, hosted by
Vietnam this year, offers an opportunity for a bold and creative approach to
signal continued U.S. commitment to economic leadership in the Asia Pacific. If
the new administration plans to focus on bilateral rather than multilateral
trade agreements, Vietnam and Malaysia are two strong candidates. Vietnam’s
imports from the United States are among the fastest growing in the world.
- Maintain
High-level Participation in Regional Diplomacy
For Southeast Asians, showing up is vitally important as a sign of
commitment, and there is no substitute for high-level participation at regional
meetings. For this reason, President Donald Trump should attend the East Asia
Summit and APEC meetings, and should also invite his Southeast Asian
counterparts to another U.S.-ASEAN leaders’ summit in the United States during
his first year, to build on the gains made since the 2016 Sunnylands summit and
send a strong signal to the region about its importance to U.S. leadership.
The secretaries of State and Defense should continue to attend the ASEAN
Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus, and other regional
forums. Failure to show up at these events would be interpreted by Southeast
Asian countries as a signal of declining U.S. commitment and would damage the
United States’ ability to effectively engage with the region. While many
Southeast Asian countries are inwardly focused, Washington should look to
Vietnam and Singapore as key partners to guide U.S. engagement with ASEAN and
in responding to tensions in the South China Sea.
- Reinvigorate
U.S. Alliances
The administration will need to work to manage strained alliances with the
Philippines and Thailand. In the Philippines, Washington should strive to preserve
the alliance to the greatest extent possible while taking a firm position on
the human rights excesses of the Duterte administration. Given the difficulties
in working with Duterte, Washington should consider shifting the spotlight in
the bilateral relationship from hard alliance issues to build on the already
strong institutional, economic, and people-to-people ties between the United
States and the Philippines. For example, events highlighting the Philippine
diaspora in the United States would serve as an effective reminder of strong
bilateral economic and people-to-people ties.
In Thailand, Washington should explore whether popular endorsement of a
new draft constitution and the tentative preparation for elections in the wake
of the royal transition provide an opportunity to begin resetting ties without
rewarding the military government. Washington should also immediately resume
dialogues with Thailand on issues of mutual strategic interest, such as
maritime security and counterterrorism. Following the Thai elections, the
United States should move quickly to restore fuller relations assuming that
acceptable standards of democratic governance and human rights have been met.
- Cultivate Key
Regional Partners
While the United States’ formal treaty alliances in Southeast Asia remain
important, many of the best opportunities for positive U.S. engagement in the
region lie with other partners. Singapore is arguably the United States’ most
important partner in the region, providing consistent cooperation on a wide
variety of economic, diplomatic, and security issues. Engagement with Jakarta
remains key because of Indonesia’s size, strategic location, and ability to
play a leadership role within ASEAN.
Malaysia and Vietnam are important emerging partners with shared interests
in cooperating with the United States on economic issues—both are
TPP-signatories—and security challenges in the South China Sea. The United
States should seek to deepen these key partnerships and encourage greater
cooperation between them and U.S. allies in Southeast Asia. The United States
should continue to support Myanmar in its ongoing bumpy transition toward
democracy, including by encouraging the peace process with the armed ethnic
groups in the north, addressing the plight of the Rakhine Muslim population in
the west, and making military-to-military engagement contingent on the
transition to civilian control of the military. In the meantime, U.S. officials
should be given more leeway to discuss these key issues with the military.
- Focus Security
Engagement on Core Challenges
The size and diversity of ASEAN make it difficult to identify areas of
cooperation that interest all members, but cooperation on core challenges like
maritime security and counterterrorism appeals to most members, and to key U.S.
partners in particular. Maritime security engagement is welcomed not only by
South China Sea claimants, but also by ASEAN states concerned with piracy,
illegal fishing, and energy security in their waters. U.S. security cooperation
programs—such as the Foreign Military Financing program and the Pentagon’s new
Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative—should continue to respond to this
demand signal from the region. The administration should consider expanding
these maritime security capacity-building initiatives and coordinating these
efforts more closely with key allies like Japan and Australia.
Counterterrorism cooperation with Southeast Asia will also remain in
demand. Engagement in this area is already robust after years of cooperation
following 9/11, but the shifting nature of the extremist threat in Southeast
Asia provides an impetus to refine existing cooperation and refocus efforts
toward problem areas like deradicalization and the tracking of fighters
returning from conflicts in the Middle East.
(This Commentary originally appeared in the February 9, 2017, issue
of Southeast Asia from Scott Circle.)
Dr. Amy Searight is a senior adviser and director of
the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Murray Hiebert is senior adviser and deputy
director of the CSIS Southeast Asia Program. Geoffrey Hartman is a fellow with
the CSIS Southeast Asia Program.
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