当前的银行风险与业务柔性，陈联教授的研究专题20181211

为加剧的失衡做好准备

收紧的美元与国际信用供给，陈联教授的研究专题

改革开放四十周年书画展，南京图书馆

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

陈联教授的网页与链接（2018）

      　陈联(SERI)的网页与链接2018 ：
      http://chenlian1.lofter.com（即http://lchen2012.blog.163.com）
      http://blog.sina.com.cn/lianchen1967
      http://weibo.cn/lianCHEN1967
      https://www.facebook.com/CHENLian67
      https://www.facebook.com/ChenLian2016
      https://twitter.com/ChenLian67
      https://chenlian67.blogspot.com
      http://blog.chinadaily.com.cn/space-uid-2060649.html
      http://202.119.85.163/open/TutorInfo.aspx?dsbh=03066
　  http://baike.baidu.com/view/6310190.htm
         陈联教授的电邮：
      lant116@126.com   llant116@yahoo.com
      lant116@163.com   lant116@sina.com.cn

CSIS:特朗普对俄罗斯的矛盾表现

Trump on Russia: His Strategy Documents vs. His Meeting with Putin
特朗普应对俄罗斯：他的战略文件、与他和普京在峰会上的表现相冲突 

By Anthony H. Cordesman, CSIS  20180717

（Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He has served as a consultant on Afghanistan to the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Department of State.）

https://www.csis.org/analysis/trump-russia-his-strategy-documents-vs-his-meeting-putin


 

There has been a peculiar dualism about the Trump Administration's approach to Russia since its start. The President's tweets and personal public statements have been largely political – often repeating themes from his campaigns or defending his election from charges of Russian interference. 

When he issued his new National Security Strategy (NSS) in December 2017, and then his new National Defense Strategy (NDS) in early 2018, some of his statements focused so much on his political themes that this indicated that he may have delegated responsibility for their contents rather than really reviewed them.

Ralph Waldo Emerson is famous for stating that, "A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds," but the President's meeting with Putin may indicate that some consistency is still necessary. It has raises serious questions about what U.S. strategy really is at the Presidential level. 

Certainly, key parts of his strategy documents and FY2019 defense budget request seem to take far harder stands on Russia than he did during his NATO Summit and visits to the United Kingdom and Russia and seem to reflect many of the views taken by his current critics.

 

1，The Warnings in President Trump's National Security Strategy

His National Security Strategy, issued with his personal signature, describes Russia as follows: 

China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity. They are determined to make economies less free and less fair, to grow their militaries, and to control information and data to repress their societies and expand their influence... China and Russia are developing advanced (nuclear) weapons and capabilities that could threaten our critical infrastructure and our command and control architecture.

...A central continuity in history is the contest for power. The present time period is no different. Three main sets of challengers—the revisionist powers of China and Russia, the rogue states of Iran and North Korea, and transnational threat organizations, particularly jihadist terrorist groups—are actively competing against the United States and our allies and partners... Russia seeks to restore its great power status and establish spheres of influence near its borders. The intentions of both nations are not necessarily fixed. The United States stands ready to cooperate across areas of mutual interest with both countries... 

Russia aims to weaken U.S. influence in the world and divide us from our allies and partners. Russia views the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU) as threats. Russia is investing in new military capabilities, including nuclear systems that remain the most significant existential threat to the United States, and in destabilizing cyber capabilities. Through modernized forms of subversive tactics, Russia interferes in the domestic political affairs of countries around the world. The combination of Russian ambition and growing military capabilities creates an unstable frontier in Eurasia, where the risk of conflict due to Russian miscalculation is growing...

China, Russia, and other state and nonstate actors recognize that the United States often views the world in binary terms, with states being either “at peace” or “at war,” when it is actually an arena of continuous competition. Our adversaries will not fight us on our terms. We will raise our competitive game to meet that challenge, to protect American interests, and to advance our values... 

Russia uses information operations as part of its offensive cyber efforts to influence public opinion across the globe. Its influence campaigns blend covert intelligence operations and false online personas with state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and paid social media users or “trolls” ...Russia, too, projects its influence economically, through the control of key energy and other infrastructure throughout parts of Europe and Central Asia.

... Although the menace of Soviet communism is gone, new threats test our will. Russia is using subversive measures to weaken the credibility of America’s commitment to Europe, undermine transatlantic unity, and weaken European institutions and governments. With its invasions of Georgia and Ukraine, Russia demonstrated its willingness to violate the sovereignty of states in the region. Russia continues to intimidate its neighbors with threatening behavior, such as nuclear posturing and the forward deployment of offensive capabilities... The e United States will deepen collaboration with our European allies and partners to confront forces threatening to undermine our common values, security interests, and shared vision. The United States and Europe will work together to counter Russian subversion and aggression.

 

2，The Warnings in His National Defense Strategy

 
His National Defense Strategy, signed by his Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, states:
Today, we are emerging from a period of strategic atrophy, aware that our competitive military advantage has been eroding. We are facing increased global disorder, characterized by decline in the long-standing rules-based international order—creating a security environment more complex and volatile than any we have experienced in recent memory. Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security...Russia has violated the borders of nearby nations and pursues veto power over the economic, diplomatic, and security decisions of its neighbors.  

... Russia seeks veto authority over nations on its periphery in terms of their governmental, economic, and diplomatic decisions, to shatter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and change European and Middle East security and economic structures to its favor. The use of emerging technologies to discredit and subvert democratic processes in Georgia, Crimea, and eastern Ukraine is concern enough, but when coupled with its expanding and modernizing nuclear arsenal the challenge is clear. 

Long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia are the principal priorities for the Department, and require both increased and sustained investment, because of the magnitude of the threats they pose to U.S. security and prosperity today, and the potential for those threats to increase in the future. 

... A strong and free Europe, bound by shared principles of democracy, national sovereignty, and commitment to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is vital to our security. The alliance will deter Russian adventurism, defeat terrorists who seek to murder innocents, and address the arc of instability building on NATO’s periphery. At the same time, NATO must adapt to remain relevant and fit for our time—in purpose, capability, and responsive decision-making. We expect European allies to fulfill their commitments to increase defense and modernization spending to bolster the alliance in the face of our shared security concerns.

 

3，An FY2019 Budget Request Based on these Assessments of Russia

The key portions of summary of the Overview to his FY2019 defense budget request state that, 
This budget was formulated around the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS) goals... The NDS prioritizes major power competition, and in particular, reversing the erosion of the U.S. military advantage in relation to China and Russia... The central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers. It is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model—gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions.

Russia seeks veto authority over nations on its periphery in terms of its governmental, economic, and diplomatic decisions, to shatter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to change European and Middle East security and economic structures to its favor. The use of emerging technologies to discredit and subvert democratic processes in Georgia, Crimea, and eastern Ukraine is concern enough, but when coupled with its expanding and modernizing nuclear arsenal the challenge is clear.

...Long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia are the principal priorities for the Department, and require both increased and sustained investment – not only to deter and if necessary confront aggression, but also to actively compete – because of the magnitude of the threats each pose to U.S. security and prosperity today. Concurrently, the Department will sustain its efforts to deter and counter rogue regimes such as North Korea and Iran, defeat terrorist threats to the United States, and consolidate the DoD’s gains in Iraq and Afghanistan while moving to a more resource-sustainable approach.

...Competitor states, especially China and Russia, have narrowed DoD’s military technological advantages, demanding the United States find new and innovative ways to fight in the future. China is now a strategic competitor, using predatory economics to intimidate its neighbors while militarizing features in the South China Sea. Russia has violated the borders of nearby nations and pursues veto power over the economic, diplomatic, and security decisions of its neighbors.

 

4，The President's Strategy and Budget Request Reflect the Collective Assessments of the U.S. Intelligence Community

 
It also important to note that the President's strategy documents and budget reflect the collective judgments of the entire U.S. intelligence community. Daniel R. Coats, his Director of National Intelligence has made his view clear on Russia's effort to interfere in the U.S. election, but he spoke for the entire U.S. intelligence community much earlier – on February 13, 2018 – in his annual testimony to Congress which presented a Worldwide Threat Assessment of the challenges to U.S. security. 

His final statement for the record not only supported all of the statement in President Trump's strategy documents, it focused on many areas of advanced technology, cyber threats, space, and nuclear weapons:

 
          The Broader Russian Threat
China and Russia will seek spheres of influence and to check US appeal and influence in their regions. Meanwhile, US allies’ and partners’ uncertainty about the willingness and capability of the United States to maintain its international commitments may drive them to consider reorienting their policies, particularly regarding trade, away from Washington...

In his probable next term in office, President Vladimir Putin will rely on assertive and opportunistic foreign policies to shape outcomes beyond Russia’s borders. He will also resort to more authoritarian tactics to maintain control amid challenges to his rule. 

Moscow will seek cooperation with the United States in areas that advance its interests. Simultaneously, Moscow will employ a variety of aggressive tactics to bolster its standing as a great power, secure a “sphere of influence” in the post-Soviet space, weaken the United States, and undermine Euro-Atlantic unity. The highly personalized nature of the Russian political system will enable Putin to act decisively to defend Russian interests or to pursue opportunities he views as enhancing Russian prestige and power abroad. 

Russia will compete with the United States most aggressively in Europe and Eurasia, while applying less intense pressure in “outer areas” and cultivating partnerships with US rivals and adversaries—as well as with traditional US partners—to constrain US power and accelerate a shift toward a “multipolar” world. Moscow will use a range of relatively low-cost tools to advance its foreign policy objectives, including influence campaigns, economic coercion, cyber operations, multilateral forums, and measured military force. Russia’s slow economic growth is unlikely to constrain Russian foreign policy or by itself trigger concessions from Moscow in Ukraine, Syria, or elsewhere in the next year. 

President Putin is likely to increase his use of repression and intimidation to contend with domestic discontent over corruption, poor social services, and a sluggish economy with structural deficiencies. He will continue to manipulate the media, distribute perks to maintain elite support, and elevate younger officials to convey an image of renewal. He is also likely to expand the government’s legal basis for repression and to enhance his capacity to intimidate and monitor political threats, perhaps using the threat of “extremism” or the 2018 World Cup to justify his actions. 

 
          Pressure on the Ukraine and other States Near Russia Ukraine remains at risk of domestic turmoil, which Russia could exploit to undermine Kyiv’s pro-West orientation. These factors will threaten Ukraine’s nascent economic recovery and potentially lead to changes in its foreign policy that further inflame tension between Russia and the West....Popular frustrations with the pace of reforms, depressed standards of living, perceptions of worsening corruption, and political polarization ahead of scheduled presidential and legislative elections in 2019 could prompt early elections. Opposition leaders will seek to capitalize on popular discontent to weaken President Petro Poroshenko and the ruling coalition ahead of elections in 2019. 

The conflict in eastern Ukraine is likely to remain stalemated and marked by fluctuating levels of violence. A major offensive by either side is unlikely in 2018, although each side’s calculus could change if it sees the other as seriously challenging the status quo. Russia will continue its military, political, and economic destabilization campaign against Ukraine to stymie and, where possible, reverse Kyiv’s efforts to integrate with the EU and strengthen ties to NATO. Kyiv will strongly resist concessions to Moscow but almost certainly will not regain control of Russian-controlled areas of eastern Ukraine in 2018. Russia will modulate levels of violence to pressure Kyiv and shape negotiations in Moscow’s favor...Russia will work to erode Western unity on sanctions and support for Kyiv, but the Kremlin is coping with sanctions at existing levels. 

...The Kremlin will seek to maintain and, where possible, expand its influence throughout the former Soviet countries that it asserts are in its self-described sphere of influence...Russia views Belarus as a critical buffer between itself and NATO and will seek to spoil any potential warming between Minsk and the West. Belarus President Aleksandr Lukashenko will continue close security cooperation with Moscow but will continue to aim for normalized relations with the West as a check on Russia’s influence.

Russia’s continued occupation of 20 percent of Georgia’s territory and efforts to undermine its Western integration will remain the primary sources of Tbilisi’s insecurity. The ruling Georgian Dream party is likely to seek to stymie the opposition and reduce institutional constraints on its power. 

Tension over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh could devolve into a large-scale military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which could draw in Russia to support its regional ally. Both sides’ reluctance to compromise, mounting domestic pressures, Azerbaijan’s steady military modernization, and Armenia’s acquisition of new Russian equipment sustain the risk of large-scale hostilities in 2018. 

Russia will pressure Central Asia’s leaders to reduce engagement with Washington and support Russian-led economic and security initiatives, while concerns about ISIS in Afghanistan will push Moscow to strengthen its security posture in the region. Poor governance and weak economies raise the risk of radicalization— especially among the many Central Asians who travel to Russia or other countries for work—presenting a threat to Central Asia, Russia, and Western societies. China will probably continue to expand outreach to Central Asia—while deferring to Russia on security and political matters—because of concern that regional instability could undermine China’s economic interests and create a permissive environment for extremists, which, in Beijing’s view, could enable Uighur militant attacks in China. 

Moldova’s ostensibly pro-European ruling coalition—unless it is defeated in elections planned for November—probably will seek to curb Russian influence and maintain a veneer of European reform while avoiding changes that would damage the coalition’s grip on power. The current Moldovan Government probably will move forward on implementing Moldova’s EU Association Agreement against the will of openly pro-Russian and Russian-backed President Igor Dodon. Settlement talks over the breakaway region of Transnistria will continue, but progress likely will be limited to small issues.

 
          Advanced Cyber, Nuclear, Space, and Missile Threats In 2018, Russia will continue to modernize, develop, and field a wide range of advanced nuclear, conventional, and asymmetric capabilities to balance its perception of a strategic military inferiority vis-avis the United States.


Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea will pose the greatest cyber threats to the United States during the next year. These states are using cyber operations as a low-cost tool of statecraft, and we assess that they will work to use cyber operations to achieve strategic objectives unless they face clear repercussions for their cyber operations. Nonstate actors will continue to use cyber operations for financial crime and to enable propaganda and messaging...The use of cyber-attacks as a foreign policy tool outside of military conflict has been mostly limited to sporadic lower-level attacks. Russia, Iran, and North Korea, however, are testing more aggressive cyber-attacks that pose growing threats to the United States and US partners.
... We expect that Russia will conduct bolder and more disruptive cyber operations during the next year, most likely using new capabilities against Ukraine. The Russian Government is likely to build on the wide range of operations it is already conducting, including disruption of Ukrainian energy-distribution networks, hack-and-leak influence operations, distributed denial-of-service attacks, and false flag operations. In the next year, Russian intelligence and security services will continue to probe US and allied critical infrastructures, as well as target the United States, NATO, and allies for insights into US policy. 

... Russia has developed a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) that the United States has declared is in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Despite Russia’s ongoing development of other Treaty-compliant missiles with intermediate ranges, Moscow probably believes that the new GLCM provides sufficient military advantages to make it worth risking the political repercussions of violating the INF Treaty. In 2013, a senior Russian administration official stated publicly that the world had changed since the INF Treaty was signed in 1987. Other Russian officials have made statements complaining that the Treaty prohibits Russia, but not some of its neighbors, from developing and possessing ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.

.. All actors will increasingly have access to space-derived information services, such as imagery, weather, communications, and positioning, navigation, and timing for intelligence, military, scientific, or business purposes. Foreign countries—particularly China and Russia—will continue to expand their space-based reconnaissance, communications, and navigation systems in terms of the numbers of satellites, the breadth of their capability, and the applications for use. 

Both Russia and China continue to pursue antisatellite (ASAT) weapons as a means to reduce US and allied military effectiveness. Russia and China aim to have nondestructive and destructive counterspace weapons available for use during a potential future conflict. We assess that, if a future conflict were to occur involving Russia or China, either country would justify attacks against US and allied satellites as necessary to offset any perceived US military advantage derived from military, civil, or commercial space systems. Military reforms in both countries in the past few years indicate an increased focus on establishing operational forces designed to integrate attacks against space systems and services with military operations in other domains. 

Russian and Chinese destructive ASAT weapons probably will reach initial operational capability in the next few years. China’s PLA has formed military units and begun initial operational training with counterspace capabilities that it has been developing, such as ground-launched ASAT missiles. Russia probably has a similar class of system in development. Both countries are also advancing directed-energy weapons technologies for the purpose of fielding ASAT weapons that could blind or damage sensitive space-based optical sensors, such as those used for remote sensing or missile defense. 

Of particular concern, Russia and China continue to launch “experimental” satellites that conduct sophisticated on-orbit activities, at least some of which are intended to advance counterspace capabilities. Some technologies with peaceful applications—such as satellite inspection, refueling, and repair—can also be used against adversary spacecraft. 

Russia and China continue to publicly and diplomatically promote international agreements on the nonweaponization of space and “no first placement” of weapons in space. However, many classes of weapons would not be addressed by such proposals, allowing them to continue their pursuit of space warfare capabilities while publicly maintaining that space must be a peaceful

          Continued Efforts to Influence U.S. and Other Elections
Director Coats also provided a clear warning about Russian efforts to conduct influence campaigns:
The United States will face a complex global foreign intelligence threat environment in 2018. We assess that the leading state intelligence threats to US interests will continue to be Russia and China, based on their services’ capabilities, intent, and broad operational scope... Influence operations, especially through cyber means, will remain a significant threat to US interests as they are low-cost, relatively low-risk, and deniable ways to retaliate against adversaries, to shape foreign perceptions, and to influence populations. Russia probably will be the most capable and aggressive source of this threat in 2018, although many countries and some nonstate actors are exploring ways to use influence operations, both domestically and abroad. 

We assess that the Russian intelligence services will continue their efforts to disseminate false information via Russian state-controlled media and covert online personas about US activities to encourage anti-US political views. Moscow seeks to create wedges that reduce trust and confidence in democratic processes, degrade democratization efforts, weaken US partnerships with European allies, undermine Western sanctions, encourage anti-US political views, and counter efforts to bring Ukraine and other former Soviet states into European institutions. 

...Foreign elections are critical inflection points that offer opportunities for Russia to advance its interests both overtly and covertly. The 2018 US mid-term elections are a potential target for Russian influence operations.

...At a minimum, we expect Russia to continue using propaganda, social media, false-flag personas, sympathetic spokespeople, and other means of influence to try to exacerbate social and political fissures in the United States. 

 
5，Diplomacy Should Be Based on facts and Strategy, Not Personalities and Politics 
President Trump did face major challenges in seeking larger defense contributions from Europe and to moderate tension with Russia. His mix of personal relations and a confrontational bargaining style is also not without its successes. Nevertheless, there are times when attention to detail and a more traditional approach to diplomacy and staffing key issues is clearly desirable. 

The previous strategy documents and intelligence assessments clearly indicate this. They reflect the assessment of Russia that the U.S. should act on at its highest levels.  

 

《战略学导论》研究生课程建设申报表

南 - - 大学
专业学位案例教学课程建设项目
申  报  表

课程名称：  战略学导论
课程编号：
项目负责人：    陈联
所在单位：      经管院
南  大学研究生院制
二○一八年五月

1.课程及教学团队简况
课  程  名  称 战略学导论 课程学分 3
课  程  性  质 专业与案例课程 近3年平均修读研究生人数
拟建设案例教学学时 48 拟建设案例总数/原创案例数 6
适 用 学 科 / 领 域 经济学（大类）、管理学（大类）
课程负责人基本情况 姓    名 陈联 性  别 男 出生年月  19
 学历/学位 博研 职  称  联系电话  

2.教学团队教学经历及主要成就
教学团队承担的研究生课程教学情况
近三年承担的研究生教学工作；负责或参与的教学研究工作；教学获奖情况；作为第一署名人发表教学研究论文情况；主编的研究生规划教材等
金融营销学，国际金融市场，金融研究专题，等；在南理工学报发表了教学论文。

3.项目建设 建设基础
该课程的教学情况及已取得的成绩，建设案例课程的必要性、可行性
本人已发表“战略学的渊源、应用与理论扩展”等论文；在前期的金融营销学研究生课程里，已经初步尝试了战略学理论的回顾及其教学和案例教学。由于广义战略学已成为我国各行各业广为关注的领域，上述课程探索中获得较好的反响，这也表明加强这一领域的研究和教学已成为当务之急。

建设的基本内容及重点内容
课程建设的主要内容：1，战略学的起源（包括：西方战略学概念的产生，中国传统战略理论，军事战略学原理）；2，二十世纪上半叶以来战略学的应用发展（包括：社会经济发展战略，地区发展战略，产业战略，公司战略管理等）；3，当前的中国内外部环境与战略分析（包括：中国的国情与发展，外部环境的变化趋势，我国大战略概要）；4，近期国际战略环境分析（包括：东北亚的地缘政治变化趋势，美国二份战略报告的新动向，上合组织的作用扩展及中亚的发展需求）；5，金融战略视角下的EIC分析（包括：塑造RMB为中心的投融资体系，RMB汇率与美元关系的新变化，资本市场开放的前景与问题）；6，加强战略学理论建设的背景与教学方向。

在上述内容中，拟以第3、第4和第5项内容为基础发展近期案例，以充实课程教学，并尝试组织学生进行课堂研讨，拓展学生思路、丰富教学形式。虽然这三方面成为案例覆盖的主要范围，但课程教学的重点更在于推动学生形成战略学的概念，逐步形成战略分析的思维，熟悉我国的战略环境和主要竞争战略。所以，教学的重点内容一方面是由案例的实际内容支撑起战略学的现实性，另一方面是，加强学生对战略学理论和方法的广泛接触及了解。正是基于上述考虑，所以课程名称才定为《战略学导论》，也就是力求由现实问题反思战略学理论和方法的重要性。

对申报案例的评价
（1、 国内外同类案例库建设状况，2、本案例教学课程的特色及创新性，
3、教学效果及教学价值。）
国内的战略学研究教学主要在北大、清华以及人大等知名高校，十多年来相
继有不少引进版和自已著述的书籍，上海社科系统也出版了一些书籍，丰富
了这一领域的理论储备。
案例库的信息较少报导，本人的案例是从相关著述和领域的研究新进展中引
用、分析而成，没有直接方便的资料库可利用。
由于我国社会经济发展迅速，已经在国际上引起广泛重视，战略竞争环境也
远不似以往，在各行业中加强战略学知识的教学、强化案例研讨，具有相当
现实的意义，这一点是无可置疑的。
建设的进度安排
从我在证券投资、国际金融市场、金融营销等课程的案例教学体会来看，需要有一个概要的计划，但
也无法过细。我考虑，如果此方案获得认同，从暑期开始，经18-19年第一学期和19-20年第一学
期两个学期教学研究和探索，应当可以比较成熟。

4. 经费预算
序号 预算支出栏目 金额（元）
1) 本人的研究工作付出
2) 国内的调研和会议支出
3) 研究和教学设备方面的支出
4) 出国研讨和调查的支出
5） 其他支出

5. 承诺与责任
1)．课程负责人保证课程资源内容不存在政治性、思想性、科学性和规范性问题；
2)．课程负责人保证申报所使用的课程资源知识产权清晰，无侵权使用的情况；
3)．课程负责人保证课程资源及申报材料不涉及国家安全和保密的相关规定，课程内容严格依据课程
建设计划实施；
4).  基于本项目的成果，积极申报省级及以上精品课程，争取立项。
课程负责人签字：
日期：2018/6/26

目标导向的城市（Urumqi）战略